Industry13 min read2550 words

One Account, Multiple People: How Should Banks Record Consent?

A joint savings account may belong to two people. A business account can involve directors, beneficial owners and authorised signatories. A nominee may be attached to another customer's account. Someone else may be authorised to act on behalf of the customer in a specific banking situation.

AquaConsento

Published: November 5, 2026
One Account, Multiple People: How Should Banks Record Consent?

A joint savings account may belong to two people. A business account can involve directors, beneficial owners and authorised signatories. A nominee may be attached to another customer's account. Someone else may be authorised to act on behalf of the customer in a specific banking situation.

From a banking-system perspective, all of those people can be connected to the same relationship.

From a consent perspective, they should not automatically become the same person.

That distinction matters because a bank may know exactly who is associated with an account and still struggle to answer a different question: who actually gave this particular permission?

For consent management for banks, the safest operating model is to keep identity, banking role, authority and the consent event separate enough that one person's choice cannot accidentally be treated as another person's.

That sounds straightforward. In real banking journeys, it rarely is.

The account shows the relationship, but not always whose choice it was

Take a typical joint account held by Ananya and Vikram. Both complete onboarding, both go through the bank’s customer due-diligence process, and both can access the same account through their own banking channels.

A few months later, Ananya chooses to receive promotional offers for selected banking products.

If the consent system records only: Joint Account 8472 — Marketing Consent: Yes

The entry looks tidy, but it is missing an important part of the story. The bank can see that the account has a positive marketing preference, but it cannot immediately tell whether that choice came from Ananya, Vikram, or both.

That difference matters because the account explains the banking relationship; it does not automatically identify the person behind a particular privacy choice. A stronger consent record keeps the account context, but also preserves who actually made the decision and what that permission applied to.

This is where banking systems can become difficult to design. The account is often the natural centre of the operational relationship, while consent may need to remain tied to an individual person and purpose.

Banks already hold a lot of identity information, so it can be tempting to assume that the consent problem is mostly solved once KYC is complete.

It is not quite that simple.

RBI's KYC framework requires customer due diligence for all joint account holders and also recognises that one person may sometimes act on behalf of another individual or entity. It separately distinguishes roles such as authorised signatories and beneficial owners in legal-entity relationships.

That is useful because it reflects something banks already know operationally: several people can be connected to the same relationship without having the same role or authority.

KYC helps establish who the person is and why they are connected to the account or entity. A consent record needs to capture something different: what that person actually agreed to, for which purpose, and in what context the decision was made.

That distinction becomes especially important in joint and business banking. Two people may both be fully verified customers and still have different permissions. An authorised signatory may be entitled to perform a banking action without automatically being able to make every personal-data choice for someone else.

AquaConsento's existing article on KYC-linked consent evidence in banking looks at the gap between identity evidence and consent evidence in more detail. The additional challenge here is what happens when several verified individuals sit around the same banking relationship and the system still needs to preserve whose choice was whose.

Start with the person, then add the banking role

A useful consent record should not begin with the assumption that an account equals a privacy identity.

It should begin with the individual.

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 defines consent around a specified purpose and says consent must be free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous, with clear affirmative action.

Those substantive provisions are part of the Act's phased commencement. Under the Government's 13 November 2025 notification, Sections 3–5 and most of Section 6 are scheduled for the eighteen-month commencement stage.

For banking architecture, the useful takeaway is not to invent a new rule for every account type. It is to preserve the relationship between the individual and the permission.

A practical record may therefore need to distinguish:

LayerWhat it tells the bank
PersonWho is connected to this consent event?
Banking roleWhy is this person connected to the account or relationship?
Authority contextIs the person acting only for themselves or under an established authority?
PurposeWhat use of personal data is the permission connected to?
Consent eventWhat choice was actually made, when and through which channel?

This is not a statutory banking matrix.

It is a system-design model intended to stop one relationship attribute from being mistaken for another.

Joint holders are the easiest place to see the problem

Return to Ananya and Vikram.

RBI's KYC directions require CDD to be followed for all joint account holders when the joint account is opened.

That means the bank should already have separate identities connected to the same account relationship.

Now imagine Ananya opts into promotional communication through mobile banking while Vikram takes no action.

If the promotional preference is personal to Ananya, the consent record should preserve that fact. The bank should be able to see that Ananya made the choice, which purpose it related to and when it occurred.

It should not need to infer her identity later from the account number.

This does not mean that every action involving a joint account necessarily requires separate consent from every holder. That would depend on the specific activity, applicable legal basis and the nature of the banking relationship.

The narrower architectural point is much safer:

When a permission belongs to an individual, the record should retain the individual who actually gave it.

Nominees create a different type of confusion

A nominee may be very important to the banking relationship, but that does not mean the consent platform should automatically treat the nominee as the account holder's general privacy representative.

Imagine a customer has nominated a spouse for a deposit account.

The bank has the nominee's identity and relationship information.

Later, a system sees that relationship and allows the nominee's action to update an unrelated promotional preference belonging to the account holder.

The problem is not that the system lacks identity information.

It has made an authority assumption.

The fact that a person is a nominee answers one banking question. It does not automatically answer every question about whether that person may make a personal-data choice for someone else.

The same caution applies to guardians, representatives and other delegated relationships.

Where one person is genuinely authorised to act for another, the system should preserve the authority context that supports that action rather than relying on a broad role label.

Authorised signatories make this especially important in business banking

Business accounts introduce another layer of complexity.

A company may have several directors, multiple authorised signatories, beneficial owners and employees who use different parts of the banking relationship.

A finance manager might be authorised to initiate certain transactions. A director may hold a different authority. A beneficial owner may be recorded for due-diligence purposes but never operate the banking portal.

Those people should not collapse into one consent identity simply because they are linked to the same company.

RBI's KYC framework explicitly distinguishes authorised signatories and beneficial owners in customer due-diligence processes.

That distinction should carry through into consent architecture.

Suppose the finance manager agrees to receive product updates personally while using the business-banking portal.

The bank should not automatically treat that event as permission from the company director, another signatory or every other individual connected to the business relationship.

The record needs to retain who acted and why that action was relevant.

This is one of the places where consent systems can become misleading over time.

Imagine an authorised signatory gives a legitimate permission in January. Six months later, that person leaves the organisation and their signatory authority is removed.

The bank should update the current role.

What it should not do is rewrite the January consent record as though the person was never an authorised signatory at the time.

The system needs to preserve both facts:

Current state:
The person is no longer an authorised signatory.

Historical state:
The person held that role when the January event occurred.

This distinction becomes useful during reviews because the bank can explain not only that a consent event happened, but also the relationship context in which it happened.

Without that history, changing an account role can unintentionally erase part of the evidence trail.

The most dangerous shortcut is using a contact detail as the identity

Banking customers often appear across several products.

The same person might have a savings account, a credit card, a joint account and a connection to a family business.

The same mobile number or email address may appear across more than one record.

Now imagine the customer changes a promotional preference through the mobile app and the consent system searches for matching records using the phone number alone.

It finds four.

If all four are updated automatically, the system may have treated a contact detail as though it were the identity of the consent subject.

That shortcut can create serious confusion.

A phone number helps a bank contact or identify a customer, but it is not, by itself, enough to tell the system which banking role and purpose a specific consent event belongs to.

A stronger model resolves the person first, identifies the relevant banking relationship and then applies the permission to the appropriate purpose.

That is a much more useful test of banking consent architecture than asking whether the platform can simply store another preference flag.

What should the bank actually keep with the permission?

The exact data model will vary from bank to bank, but teams should be able to reconstruct the context of an important consent event without holding a meeting between Product, Compliance and Engineering.

A useful record could preserve:

  • the individual identity reference;
  • the relevant account or customer relationship;
  • the person's role at the time;
  • any established authority context where another person was acting;
  • the purpose;
  • the notice or consent context presented;
  • the choice made;
  • the timestamp and channel;
  • subsequent changes or withdrawal.

The point is not to create more fields for the sake of completeness.

It is to retain enough context that the bank does not later have to guess whose permission it is looking at.

Test the model by changing the relationship, not just the preference

A useful way to test this kind of consent architecture is to follow one customer relationship as it changes over time.

Imagine Ananya and Vikram open a joint account. Ananya later opts into an optional promotional purpose. A few months after that, the nominee linked to the account is changed. Then one of the joint holders updates a preference through a different banking channel.

At that point, the interesting question is not whether each screen showed the correct checkbox. It is whether the underlying records still make sense.

Ananya’s original consent should still belong to Ananya. Vikram’s record should not change simply because they share the same account. Updating the nominee should not quietly create a new assumption about who can make privacy choices. And the bank should still be able to see which notice and purpose applied when Ananya made her original decision.

If the team has to reconstruct that history manually across several systems, the weakness is probably not in the consent wording. It is in the way identity, banking roles and permission records have been connected behind the scenes.

A bank needs a consent layer that can work with existing customer identity, product and KYC systems without treating all of those records as interchangeable.

AquaConsento's current banking platform describes KYC consent orchestration, product-level consent visibility, reviewable consent history, evidence retrieval and role-scoped banking operations.

For teams managing consent governance across banking customer journeys, the value of that operating layer is not simply that it captures another “yes” or “no.”

It should make the surrounding context easier to understand: which person made the choice, what purpose it related to, how that person was connected to the banking relationship and what happened later.

That distinction becomes more important as consent travels across branch systems, mobile banking, CRM, support, campaign tools and product platforms.

Software can preserve that structure.

It should not invent legal authority that the bank has not established.

The simplest rule is to stop treating identity, role and permission as the same fact

Banking relationships are complicated because the same person can hold several roles, and the same account can involve several people.

That is normal.

The consent model becomes fragile only when the system tries to simplify those relationships into one account-level flag.

A person may be KYC verified without having agreed to an optional purpose. A nominee may be connected to an account without being authorised to make every privacy choice for the account holder. An authorised signatory may act for a business without becoming the privacy proxy for every individual connected to that business.

Good consent management for banks keeps those distinctions visible.

The objective is not to create a more complicated database.

It is to make sure the bank can still answer a very basic question months or years later:

Who actually made this choice, and what did it apply to?

When the system can answer that without reconstructing the story from multiple teams and applications, the consent record becomes far more useful.

Frequently Asked Questions

Should a joint bank account have one consent record or separate records for each holder?
The account relationship may be shared, but a consent event involving an individual's personal-data choice should preserve the identity of the person who actually made that choice. Whether a particular banking activity requires one or multiple consents depends on the activity, applicable legal basis and surrounding legal context.
Is KYC consent management the same as customer identity verification?
No. Customer due diligence and identity verification establish who the customer is and support KYC obligations. Consent evidence addresses what permission was given for a particular purpose, how it was captured and how that choice changed over time. The two processes may connect, but they should not be treated as the same record.
Can a nominee give privacy consent for the account holder?
Nominee status alone should not be treated by a consent system as universal authority to make every personal-data decision for the account holder. The bank should determine the actual authority available under the relevant law, mandate and banking arrangement before allowing one person to act for another.
How should a bank record consent from an authorised signatory?
The record should preserve the signatory's identity, the business or person represented, the relevant role or authority context, the purpose and the actual consent event. Banking authority should not automatically be assumed to cover unrelated personal-data purposes.
What happens to consent records when a banking role changes?
The bank can update the person's current role while preserving the historical consent event as it occurred. If someone was an authorised signatory when a permission was captured, that context should remain part of the historical record even if the person's current role later changes.

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